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Transformative Constitutions and the Role of 
Integrity Institutions in Tempering Power: 
The Case of Resistance to State Capture in 
Post-Apartheid South Africa 
HEINZ KLUG† 
INTRODUCTION 
Post-conflict or post-colonial constitutions are 
increasingly understood to be “transformative” constitutions. 
While initially a term used to describe South Africa’s post-
apartheid constitutional order,1 the idea of a transformative 
constitution may be best described as the adoption of a 
constitutional order which is expected to “transform” the 
existing pre-constitutional order. To this extent, these 
constitutions are aspirational and are meant to empower the 
newly democratized state to make significant changes to the 
existing social and economic order. This perceived need for a 
powerful state, to overcome the legacies of conflict and the 
social conditions that divided the society, is in direct tension 
with the liberal constitutional notion of limited government. 
While constitutions establish and empower government, 
constitutionalism is thought to ensure that government 
continues to represent and respect the rights of the people in 
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 1. See generally Karl E. Klare, Legal Culture and Transformative 
Constitutionalism, 14 S. AFR. J. ON HUM. RTS. 146 (1998). 
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whose name most constitutions are now created. 
Limited government is often presented as a goal of 
constitutionalism. While the organization of power has been 
described as the “engine room” of the constitution,2 
constitutionalism implies that this power is managed by 
distributing it among different institutions. Traditionally 
this division of power is described as the separation of 
powers, yet there is little consistency in the constitutional 
manifestation of this institutional form. If some 
authoritarian states, such as South Africa’s apartheid 
regime, claimed adherence to the rule of law by focusing 
simply on the formal procedural requirements for the 
adoption of legislation regardless of its content, then 
constitutionalists have looked to the separate allocation of 
power as a means of ensuring that the different branches of 
government are able to check one another and thus ensure a 
more substantive version of the rule of law. These checks and 
balances are seen as both the product and means of ensuring 
a separation of the tres politica—the legislative, executive 
and judicial branches—yet in practice, there is rarely a strict 
formal separation. More often there is a close political 
connection between the legislature and the executive, 
especially when a single political party, by institutional 
design or political fortune, spans or controls both branches. 
The judiciary, by comparison is, in most cases, institutionally 
more separate and judicial independence is held up as the 
ideal. 
This tension, between the organization and separation of 
power, is at the heart of South Africa’s post-apartheid 
constitutional order in which a popular, democratically 
elected ruling party coexists with a constitutional promise of 
democratic accountability. Structurally, the duty to ensure 
accountability is constitutionally allocated to Parliament, 
which bears the traditional legislative role of overseeing the 
 
 2. See ROBERTO GARGARELLA, LATIN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 1810–
2010 185–87 (2013). 
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executive in addition to law-making, and to a range of 
independent institutions that emerged from the particular 
history of South Africa’s democratic transition. Furthermore, 
as a constitutional democracy, the courts, and the 
Constitutional Court in particular, are charged with 
determining the allocation of constitutional authority and 
resolving conflicts that might be brought to the courts as 
different institutions struggle to ensure that there is legal 
accountability for governmental failures as well as 
individual malfeasance. This structure reflects an attempt to 
institutionalize a system of checks and balances that relies 
neither on a strict or formal separation of powers, nor does it 
fragment power to the extent that it paralyzes governance. 
Instead, it seeks to provide a constitutional system of 
governance in which the government is empowered to 
address the legacies of apartheid while also creating multiple 
sites of power and authority to which political and social 
groups in conflict may repeatedly turn in their attempts to 
both be heard and to protect their interests or achieve, at 
times, irreconcilable goals. 
It is this creation of a constitutional order of multiple 
independent institutions beyond the traditional tres publica 
that provides the context in which this Paper seeks to explore 
Martin Krygier’s idea of tempering power.3 Focusing on the 
struggles over corruption and “state capture” that have 
dominated South African political life for the last decade, 
this Paper seeks to demonstrate that the existence of a 
combination of “integrity institutions” and the 
Constitutional Courts development of a doctrine of 
separation of powers that recognized the unique role of these 
institutions were major factors in the ability of individuals, 
non-government organizations, and opposition political 
parties to “temper” the abuse of power that had begun to 
undermine the post-apartheid democracy. Before 
 
 3. See Martin Krygier, Tempering Power, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND RULE 
OF LAW 34 (Maurice Adams et al., eds., 2017). 
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considering the legal struggles that have marked this 
process, this Paper explores the relationship between the 
separation of powers as an idea, as well as constitutional 
doctrine and the creation of integrity institutions in South 
Africa’s post-apartheid constitutional order. This Paper then 
discusses how the traditional forms of democratic 
accountability were undermined by corruption and how the 
integrity institutions and the courts were confronted by the 
struggle over corruption in state institutions. Finally, this 
Paper explores how the appellate courts, including the 
Supreme Court of Appeal and the Constitutional Court 
interpreted the constitutional provisions creating the 
“integrity institutions” and the Public Protector in 
particular, as well as their separation of powers doctrine to 
protect the role of these institutions against the political 
branches attempts to shield the president from charges of 
corruption. In conclusion, this Paper suggests that the idea 
of tempering power is a productive framing to understand 
the role of integrity institutions in South Africa’s 
constitutional democracy. 
SEPARATION OF POWERS AND INTEGRITY INSTITUTIONS 
The goal of constitution makers in adopting the 
separation of powers is often described as a means to avoid 
the concentration of power and to “ensure accountability, 
responsiveness and openness”4 in the practice of governance. 
While the separation of powers cannot be found explicitly 
enshrined in any single provision of the South African 
Constitution, or in most other constitutions, it is a core 
element in the structural design of the Constitution and is 
expressed in the multiple provisions that create specific 
checks and balances between the different branches and 
institutions of government. Although traditional approaches 
to the political idea and legal doctrine of the separation of 
powers focus on the checks and balances between the 
 
 4. S. AFR. (INTERM) CONST., 1993, Schedule 4, Constitutional Principle VI. 
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legislature, executive, and judiciary, the problem of political 
and legal accountability is no longer contained solely within 
these institutional parameters. Increasingly, constitutional 
designers have created additional mechanisms and 
institutions in their efforts in ensure the desired goals of 
accountability, responsiveness and openness in the exercise 
of governmental authority. These new institutions have 
proliferated in new and amended constitutions since the late 
20th century. 
The inclusion of a plethora of new constitutional 
institutions to address governmental accountability has 
direct implications for any conception of the separation of 
powers.5 On the one hand, the existence of these new 
institutions makes it difficult to maintain a very formal 
conception of the separation of powers as a trilateral system 
of checks and balances between the three traditional 
branches of government—the legislature, executive, and 
judiciary. On the other hand, it also complicates a simple 
functionalist approach which distinguishes between the 
making, implementing, and interpreting of laws. Instead, the 
task is further complicated by the fact that, in addition to the 
different coordinate branches of government, modern 
constitutions—and even some older constitutional orders—
are laden with institutions of governance that do not fit 
neatly into either a formalist or functionalist conception of 
the separation of powers. Instead, these different 
institutions exercise public power relatively independent of 
the three traditional branches, or at least they have a degree 
of constitutionally protected decisional autonomy and 
independence that is at odds with our traditional notions of 
the trilateral structure of government. 
The Origins of the Chapter Nine Institutions 
The idea of creating independent institutions outside of 
 
 5. See generally Bruce Ackermann, The New Separation of Powers 113 HARV. 
L. REV. 633 (2000). 
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the traditional three branches of government in South Africa 
had its origins in the democratic transition. Early on in the 
negotiations towards a democratic transition, the idea of 
creating an “ombudsman” to provide an avenue for 
complaints and for the investigation of malfeasance and 
maladministration in the state and its bureaucracy, and 
even to protect fundamental rights, was reflected in the 
proposals being made by the different parties. The scope and 
nature of such an office remained, however, a matter of 
debate.6 Furthermore, the idea of creating independent 
governance institutions as a means of addressing the high 
level of distrust between the parties and to enable specific 
aspects of the transition was also being discussed.7 The 
African National Congress (ANC) Constitutional 
Committee’s working document on “A bill of rights for a new 
South Africa,” published in 1990 specifically included the 
establishment of an independent ombudsperson as part of 
the section on the enforcement of rights “[w]ith a view to 
ensuring that all functions and duties under the Constitution 
are carried out in a fair way with due respect for the rights 
and sentiments of those affected.”8 
As the country prepared for its first democratic elections, 
questions arose about the management of the elections. Up 
until 1990, the government had organized and managed all 
elections. However, serious concerns were raised about the 
legitimacy of the first democratic election if the apartheid 
regime was to conduct it, especially if conflict were to arise 
over the results. On the one hand, the liberation movement 
sought to resolve this problem by calling for the installation 
of an Interim Government, as proposed in the internationally 
sanctioned Harare Declaration. On the other hand, the 
 
 6. See S. AFR. LAW COMM’N, REPORT ON CONSTITUTIONAL MODELS Ch. 23 
(1991). 
 7. See HEINZ KLUG, CONSTITUTING DEMOCRACY: LAW, GLOBALIZATION AND 
SOUTH AFRICA’S POLITICAL RECONSTRUCTION 119–21 (2000). 
 8. ANC CONSTITUTIONAL COMMITTEE, A BILL OF RIGHTS FOR A NEW SOUTH 
AFRICA 36–37 (1990). 
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incumbent regime argued that there could be no handover of 
power before a negotiated solution, insisting on legal 
continuity between the existing state and any future legal 
order. Faced with this irresolvable conflict, the ANC 
embraced the option of creating a number of independent 
bodies to oversee the transition to democracy, including an 
independent electoral commission to manage the election 
itself. 
The democratic transition was thus facilitated in the 
period leading up to the first democratic election by the 
establishment of three independent institutions: the 
Independent Electoral Commission, the Independent Media 
Commission, and the Independent Broadcasting Authority.9 
The embrace of the concept of transitional mechanisms and 
the legal institutions it spawned fit well in this period with 
the global emphasis on expanding democratic 
constitutionalism. It also set the stage for the subsequent 
embrace of the idea of “state institutions supporting 
constitutional democracy” that became an important 
innovation in South Africa’s 1996 ‘final’ Constitution. 
Chapter Nine of the Constitution establishes six separate 
institutions: the Public Protector; the South African Human 
Rights Commission; the Commission for the Promotion and 
Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic 
Communities; the Commission for Gender Equality; the 
Auditor General; and the Electoral Commission. These 
institutions are part of a constitutional scheme that includes 
structural and institutional elements designed to fulfill the 
goals of effective democratic governance. Most significant to 
the problem of accountability, however, are the three 
“integrity institutions”: the Public Protector, the Auditor 
General, and the Electoral Commission. 
While a key structural feature of the Constitution is the 
 
 9. Heinz Klug, Constitution-Making, Democracy and the “Civilizing” of 
Irreconcilable Conflict: What Might We Learn from the South African Miracle?, 
25 WIS. INT’L L.J. 269, 277, 279 (2007). 
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way in which power is both distributed and integrated in a 
system of governance that is designed to both avoid the 
paralysis of a rigid separation of powers and ensure 
accountability by providing multiple avenues for democratic 
and legal contestation, it is the “integrity institutions” that 
have come to play a central role, together with the 
Constitutional Court, in these processes. In addition to the 
distribution and integration of power in South Africa’s 
“federal” system of cooperative government, it has been the 
integrity institutions that have been central to struggles over 
accountability. Ensuring clean elections, fiscal integrity, 
transparent procurement, and just administration are 
constant sources of conflict at all levels of government as the 
country grapples with the enormous task of addressing the 
crippling legacies of colonialism and apartheid. The 
Constitutional Assembly understood the role of these 
institutional features of the Constitution as key to the 
commitment to constitutional democracy, bringing them 
together in an innovative and unique fashion in Chapter 
Nine as “State Institutions Supporting Constitutional 
Democracy.” At one end of the institutional spectrum, the 
Electoral Commission, the Auditor General, and the Public 
Protector are institutions primarily designed to ensure good 
governance today, while on the other end, the Human Rights 
Commission and the Commissions for Gender Equality and 
for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, 
Religious and Linguistic Communities look both to the 
present, yet also have an aspirational mandate in that they 
are tasked with furthering the constitutional promise of 
achieving a more equitable and sustainable society. 
While these institutions have not always been effective 
in performing their mandates during the first quarter 
century of democracy in South Africa, it is important to 
recognize that they do have a distinct role in ensuring that 
the promises of human rights and good governance reach 
down into the daily administration of the country and are not 
merely the subject of five-yearly electoral contests or high-
2019] TRANSFORMATIVE CONSTITUTIONS 709 
profile legal disputes. In order to achieve these goals, the 
Constitution establishes all these institutions as 
“independent, and subject only to the Constitution and the 
law,” requiring them to be “impartial” and to “exercise their 
powers and perform their functions without fear, favour or 
prejudice.”10 Despite internal conflicts and complaints about 
limited resources, the Chapter Nine institutions have 
become an unquestioned part of the institutional landscape, 
and despite the unique constitutional character of this 
“fourth” branch of government, it has proven to be a valuable 
addition in what has become from a global perspective, a 
vibrant and contentious young democracy. 
At the same time, the proliferation of new institutions 
raises important questions about their institutional 
authority and place in the constitutional system. What 
exactly is the role of each of these institutions in the 
achievement of democratic constitutionalism and how does it 
fit within the realm of the separation of powers? Whether it 
is questions of appropriate investigative capacities, reporting 
and prosecutorial functions, or the appointment and 
institutional independence of officials within these 
institutions, the question of their constitutional status and 
relationship with the other branches or institutions of 
government quickly implicates the allocation and separation 
of powers within the constitutional system. Nowhere has this 
question been more salient than in cases challenging 
malfeasance within the dominant political party. Along with 
a complex institutional structure and an active civil society, 
contestation over the scope of the constitutional powers of 
these institutions, and especially that of the Public Protector, 
has brought these questions to the center of the struggle over 
the separation of powers and accountable government. 
 
 10. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 ch. 9, § 181(2). 
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The Constitutional Court’s interpretation of the Separation 
of powers 
The Constitutional Court has repeatedly stated that the 
history of the country and the Constitution requires a 
particularly South African understanding of the separation 
of powers. In October 2005, then Constitutional Court 
Justice Kate O’Regan delivered the F W de Klerk Memorial 
Lecture; she took the opportunity to discuss the Court’s 
emerging separation of powers doctrine, concluding that a 
variety of principles could be identified and “while clearly not 
absolute, the doctrine . . . rests on a functional 
understanding of the powers and requires that each 
institution’s character and competence to perform these 
powers be protected.”11 In applying the doctrine, Justice 
O’Regan argued, the courts “must remain sensible to the 
legitimate constitutional interests of the other arms of 
government and seek to ensure that the manner of their 
intrusion, while protecting fundamental rights, intrudes as 
little as possible in the terrain of the executive and 
legislature.” Recognizing that there is no “absolute 
separation of powers” the Constitutional Court’s doctrine 
holds that “within the separation of powers each branch [of 
government] has a specific mandate”12 and that the nub of 
the separation of powers issue remains the interaction 
between these distinct institutions, functions and powers. 
Five years later, Justice Dikgang Moseneke noted in a 
Constitutional Court judgment that the “Constitution makes 
no express provision for separation of powers”13 but argued 
 
 11. Kate O’Regan Checks and Balances: Reflections on the Development of 
the Doctrine of Separation of Powers Under the South African Constitution, F W 
De Klerk Memorial Lecture (Oct. 10, 2005), in 8 POTCHEFSTROOM ELECTRONIC 
L.J., no. 1, 2005, at 120, 145. 
 12. Sebastian Seedorf & Sanele Sibanda, Separation of Powers, in 1 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF SOUTH AFRICA § 12-3 (Stu Woolman et al., eds., 2d ed. 
2013). 
 13. Int’l Trade Admin. Comm’n v. SCAW S. Afr. (Pty) Ltd. (4) SA 618 (CC) 
para. 90 (S. Afr.). 
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that “[i]t is now clear from a steady trickle of judgments that 
the doctrine of separation of powers is part of our 
constitutional architecture” and that the “Courts are carving 
out a distinctively South African design of separation of 
powers.”14 This design, he argued, “must sit comfortably with 
the democratic system of government we have chosen” and 
“must find the careful equilibrium that is imposed on our 
constitutional arrangements by our peculiar history.”15 
Describing the design, Justice Moseneke noted that it must 
both “give due recognition to the popular will as expressed 
legislatively” and “ensure effective executive government to 
minister to the endemic deprivation of the poor and 
marginalized” but at the same time, “all public power must 
be under constitutional control.”16 This requires that while 
“[e]ach arm of the state must act within the boundaries 
set[,]” it is for the courts to “determine whether unauthorized 
trespassing by one arm of the state into the terrain of 
another has occurred.”17 
The effect of this “constitutional obligation” is that the 
courts will regularly “confront the question of whether to 
venture into the domain of other branches of government and 
the extent of such intervention[,]” thus requiring the courts 
to “observe the limits of their own power.”18 As a result, 
Justice Moseneke argued “[t]he primary responsibility of a 
court is not to make decisions reserved for or within the 
domain of other branches of government, but rather to 
ensure that the concerned branches of government exercise 
their authority within the bounds of the Constitution.”19 
Furthermore, in performing this function the courts are 
restrained to the extent that “specific powers and functions 
 
 14. Id. para. 91. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. para. 92. 
 18. Id. para. 93. 
 19. Id. para. 95. 
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[are entrusted] to a particular branch of government” by the 
Constitution or by valid legislation.20 Justice Moseneke goes 
on to warn that if the courts were to “usurp that power or 
function by making a decision of their preference” they would 
in effect “frustrate the balance of power implied in the 
principle of separation of powers”.21 
As South African academic commentators Sibastian 
Seedorf and Sanele Sibanda argue, “understanding the 
nature of each branch’s separate (or pre-eminent) domain is 
as important for the theoretical and practical elaboration of 
the separation of powers principle as the acknowledgement 
of mutual checks and balances.”22 From this perspective, 
they argue that “the principle of pre-eminent domain 
protects the core functions and powers of each branch of 
government against intrusions from outside, while other 
intrusions are treated as checks and balances.”23 Even if the 
notion that “there are certain matters that are pre-eminently 
within the domain of one or other of the arms of 
government”24 provides a useful guideline in the allocation of 
constitutional authority among different institutions, this 
does not resolve the more delicate question: what is the 
extent of the constitutional powers of the courts who are 
called upon to police these boundaries? 
The Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence also 
demonstrates how the structural features of the constitution 
and hence the notion of a separation of powers evolves 
through political and legal contestation for institutional 
independence and integrity among the different spheres of 
government. In the case of Van der Merwe v. Road Accident 
Fund, the Court noted that in the “proceedings before the 
High Court[,]” the relevant government Minister was “[f]or 
 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. para. 95. 
 22. Seedorf & Sibanda supra note 12, § 12–39. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
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some obscure reason” not a party before the court25 and then 
pointed out that it had repeatedly emphasized that as a 
matter of fairness in litigation “when the constitutional 
validity of an act of parliament is impugned, the Minister 
responsible for its administration must be a party to the 
proceedings inasmuch as his or her views and evidence 
tendered ought to be heard and considered.”26 Placing this in 
the context of the separation of powers, Justice Moseneke, 
writing for the Court, stated that “[o]rdinarily courts should 
not pronounce on the validity of impugned legislation 
without the benefit of hearing the state organ concerned on 
the purpose pursued by the legislation, its legitimacy, the 
factual context, the impact of its application, and the 
justification, if any, for limiting an entrenched right.”27 
Unlike those who argue that the separation of powers 
implies the co-equal right of the different coordinate 
branches of government to determine their specific powers, 
in the South African context, the Constitutional Court has 
the constitutional duty to make the final determination. The 
clear implication is that a court should not pronounce on the 
decision of another branch of government without first giving 
the relevant branch an opportunity to justify the decision or 
action as within its understanding of the constitution. 
Respect for the views of state organs is evident too in the 
rules of the Constitutional Court which require the joinder of 
the relevant state authorities in confirmation proceedings; 
Rule 5(2) explicitly provides that the Constitutional Court 
“shall not make an order of constitutional invalidity of 
legislation unless the authority concerned is joined as a party 
to the proceedings.”28 This concern, that there be respect for 
the role of other branches of government, takes on even 
 
 25. Van der Merwve v. Rd. Accident Fund 2006 (4) SA 230 (CC) para. 6 (S. 
Afr.). 
 26. Id. para. 7. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. para. 8. 
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greater urgency when dealing with the President of the 
Republic. In Masethla v. President of the Republic of South 
Africa the former Director-General of Intelligence, Billy 
Masethla, claimed that his dismissal from his post was done 
without legal authority and requested that the 
Constitutional Court reinstate him to his position.29 While 
there was some debate on the Constitutional Court about the 
source of legal authority relied upon by President Thabo 
Mbeki in dismissing Masethla, the Court’s opinion made it 
clear that given the context of the relationship between the 
President and the head of the intelligence services, it was 
appropriate to imply the power to dismiss as a necessary 
component of the power to appoint since the President’s trust 
and confidence in the head of intelligence is essential to the 
constitutional structure and executive tasks involved.30 This 
case was not explicitly discussed as a separation of powers 
issue, nor was the focus on the lack of formal legal rules 
governing the relationship between the President and the 
Director-General of Intelligence. Instead, the Court focused 
on the factual context in which the President could not be 
expected to rely on information coming from a person in 
whom the President no longer had full confidence.31 
In Van Abo v. President of the Republic of South Africa, 
the Court was asked to review the government’s refusal to 
take up a claim for diplomatic protection by a South African 
citizen against the government of Zimbabwe for the violation 
of his property rights.32 In this case the government chose 
not to appeal a High Court order that the government should 
intervene diplomatically on Mr. Van Abo’s behalf but instead 
objected to the order’s determination that the President had 
failed to perform his constitutional obligations. The 
 
 29. Masetlha v. President of the Republic of South Africa, 2008 (1) SA 566 (CC) 
paras. 1–2 (S. Afr.). 
 30. Id. para. 68. 
 31. See id. 
 32. Von Abo v. President of South Africa2009 (5) SA 345 (CC) paras. 1–2 (S. 
Afr.). 
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Constitutional Court’s decision in Van Abo applied a 
contextual approach to the question of presidential conduct, 
holding that while the Department of Foreign Affairs stated 
it was in fact engaged in diplomatic activities on Van Abo’s 
behalf, there was no relevant Presidential conduct in this 
case.33 The Court went on to point out that “[m]any of the 
powers and obligations in section 84(2) [of the Constitution] 
vest in the President as Head of State and head of the 
national executive.”34 However, it continued by stating that, 
while these are functions the President is constitutionally 
required to perform, “[o]rdinarily they would be matters that 
have important political consequences [which calls] for a 
measure of comity between the judicial and executive 
branches of the state.”35 Applying this approach to the case, 
the Court held that the responsibility for foreign affairs is an 
executive function and therefore the collective responsibility 
of the executive and not presidential conduct “within the 
meaning of section 172(2)(a) of the Constitution.”36 
The interaction between appropriate comity and the 
exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction arose again in a case 
brought by the leader of the opposition in Parliament, 
Lindiwe Mazibuko, who claimed that the Speaker of the 
House and the ruling party were preventing the opposition 
from tabling a motion of no confidence in the President.37 
Noting that “the importance of a motion of no confidence to 
the proper functioning of our constitutional democracy 
cannot be gainsaid[,]”38 the Court argued that “[t]he primary 
purpose of a motion of no confidence is to ensure that the 
President and the national executive are accountable to the 
Assembly made up of elected representatives” and therefore 
 
 33. See id. para. 43. 
 34. Id. para. 37. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. para. 53. 
 37. Mazibuko v. Sisulu 2013 (6) SA 249 (CC) paras. 1 & 3 (S. Afr.). 
 38. Id. para. 21. 
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“a motion of no confidence plays an important role in giving 
effect to the checks and balances element of our separation-
of-powers doctrine.”39 Disagreeing with the argument 
advanced by the Speaker “that the exercise of jurisdiction 
would offend the separation of powers doctrine in light of the 
ongoing negotiations within the Assembly[,]”40 the Court 
stated that “[a]n order of constitutional invalidity would not 
be invasive because it is declaratory in kind” and thus the 
Constitutional Court “would be properly requiring the 
Assembly to remedy the constitutional defect that threatens 
the right of members of the Assembly” rather than 
“formulating Rules for the Assembly”.41 In his opinion for the 
Court, Justice Moseneke made it clear that there is a 
distinction between a declaration of invalidity, which is a 
decision clearly within the core function of the Constitutional 
Court, and the formulation of the rules of parliamentary 
procedure, which are within the domain of the legislature. A 
declaration of invalidity in this context respects the 
separation of powers in that the Constitutional Court is duty 
bound to declare if any action is in violation of the 
constitution—however, it does not violate the separation of 
powers or the comity due to the legislature in that 
Parliament is left alone to reform its own rules to correct the 
constitutional defect.42 
Concern that the judiciary remain cognizant of the limits 
of its own authority in the context of the separation of powers 
is especially evident in jurisprudence on the granting of 
temporary restraining orders (TROs). This issue was 
centrally addressed in the e-tolling case, National Treasury 
v. Opposition to Urban Tolling Alliance (OUTA), where the 
impact of the High Court’s interim order was that the 
 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. para. 67. 
 41. Id. para. 71. 
 42. Cf. Firoz Cachalia, Judicial Review of Parliamentary Rulemaking: A 
Provisional Case for Restraint 60 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 379 (2015–16). 
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“National Executive [was] prevented from fulfilling its 
statutory and budgetary responsibilities for as long as the 
interim order [was] in place.”43 Furthermore, the order 
compelled the government to re-allocate otherwise budgeted 
funds thus having “a direct and immediate impact on 
separation of powers as well as ongoing irreparable financial 
and budgetary harm.”44 In its analysis of the question of 
temporary restraining orders, the Court pointed out that 
“separation of powers is an even more vital tenet of our 
constitutional democracy” empowering the courts to ensure 
that “all branches of government act within the law.”45 
However, in his judgment, Justice Moseneke immediately 
stated that “courts in turn must refrain from entering the 
exclusive terrain of the Executive and the Legislative 
branches of Government unless the intrusion is mandated by 
the Constitution itself.”46 
Addressing the specifics of the litigation and the High 
Court’s decision to grant an interim order, the Court held 
that it is necessary, when probing the extent that the interim 
order “will probably intrude into the exclusive terrain of 
another branch of Government[,]” that the courts consider 
“what may be called separation of powers harm”47 and that 
“a temporary restraint against the exercise of statutory 
power well ahead of the final adjudication of a claimant’s 
case may be granted only in the clearest of cases[.]”48 While 
the Court did not define the ‘clearest of cases,’ it did note that 
an important consideration would be if the potential harm 
involves the breach of fundamental rights protected by the 
Bill of Rights. Since this case did not involve a fundamental 
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right, the opinion went on to discuss the problem of the 
separation of powers in the context of an interim order more 
generally and cited the Constitutional Court’s statement in 
Doctors for Life where the Court warned that: 
Where the Constitution or valid legislation has entrusted specific 
powers and functions to a particular branch of government, courts 
may not usurp that power or function by making a decision of their 
preference. That would frustrate the balance of power implied in the 
principle of separation of powers. The primary responsibility of a 
court is not to make decisions reserved for or within the domain of 
other branches of government, but rather to ensure that the 
concerned branches of government exercise their authority within 
the bounds of the Constitution. This would especially be so where 
the decision in issue is policy-laden as well as polycentric.49 
Despite this stern warning, the Constitutional Court noted 
that “this does not mean that an organ of state is immunised 
from judicial review only on account of separation of 
powers.”50 In a situation where a Court finds that the organ 
of state has acted outside the law, then it would be 
appropriate to grant an interdict since “[t]he exercise of all 
public power is subject to constitutional control” and the 
decisions under review “would in effect be contrary to the law 
and thus void.”51 However, the Court later emphasized that 
despite the difficulty courts might have in making some 
policy laden and particularly polycentric decisions, when a 
court considers “the grant of an interim interdict against the 
exercise of power within the camp of Government [it] must 
have the separation of powers consideration at the very 
forefront” of its analysis.52 
CORRUPTION, STATE CAPTURE AND THE UNDERMINING OF THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 
Parliament’s first major oversight challenge occurred in 
 
 49. Id. para. 63. 
 50. Id. para. 64. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. para. 68. 
2019] TRANSFORMATIVE CONSTITUTIONS 719 
early 1996 when it was revealed in the press that the 
Department of Health was spending R14.2 million on a 
musical that was to tour the country providing education on 
the growing HIV/AIDS pandemic, an expenditure that 
represented a significant portion of the health department’s 
HIV/AIDS prevention efforts. The musical itself, ‘Sarafina II’ 
was criticized for failing to impart a clear public health 
message. But the scandal focused on the high costs of 
production—including the salaries, luxurious facilities, and, 
what was seen as, the inappropriate grandeur of the 
production itself. When the Portfolio Committee first called 
on the Minister of Health to justify this expenditure, she 
purportedly refused to attend the hearing. After the 
government realized the Minster’s refusal to attend would be 
politically embarrassing, her appearance before the 
committee merely demonstrated how new the concept of 
oversight was for the legislature. First, the Members of 
Parliament (MPs) relied mainly on press reports to challenge 
the Minister, instead of demanding access to the official 
documentation, which was their right. Second, the ANC 
members remained extraordinarily passive, caught between 
the exercise of their parliamentary duty and loyalty to the 
government. As one ANC member later admitted, “It was 
still early days. We did not know how to deal with something 
like this. Perhaps we should be condemned for it, perhaps we 
should be forgiven, but we were more concerned with damage 
control than we were with parliamentary accountability.”53 
The Committee’s failure was further highlighted when the 
Public Protector issued a report in June 1996 that 
documented the mismanagement of tender procedures and 
the “unauthorized expenditure of foreign aid” in this 
project.54 
Parliament’s ability to act as an effective watchdog was 
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further undermined by its own dalliance in addressing a 
pattern of systematic abuse by MPs from across the political 
spectrum. The first inklings of what would come to be known 
as “travelgate” surfaced in the year 2000, when Speaker of 
Parliament, Frene Ginwala, publicly rebuked two MPs for 
abusing travel vouchers granted annually in a check-book 
type format to allow MPs to travel between Parliament in 
Cape Town and their constituencies or homes around the 
country.55 By the time the scandal unraveled in 2007 it 
embroiled more than 100 MPs who were forced to resign, 
plead guilty and enter into plea-bargains to repay millions of 
Rands to Parliament for fraudulent claims; or were brought 
to trial and convicted as a result of their misuse or even the 
sale of their parliamentary travel allocations for private 
benefit. Even more damaging has been the fact that “senior 
ANC leaders and Cabinet members involved have, in most 
instances, quietly paid back the money that was defrauded 
from Parliament.”56 As a result, the integrity of the 
institution was severely compromised since the toleration of 
corrupt practices within Parliament made it harder to claim 
the high ground when policing similar practices in the 
Executive. 
While Parliament has always been the primary source of 
formal law-making in South Africa, it has historically never 
managed to serve very effectively as a watchdog. This may, 
of course, be attributed to a number of both structural and 
conventional conditions. First, as a fused-system, in which 
the executive is part of a legislature dominated by the ruling 
party, it would be a surprise if it really was able to hold the 
government accountable in the face of party solidarity. 
Second, the parliamentary tradition has long seen major 
problems of accountability or disaster channelled into 
government-appointed Commissions of Enquiry that are 
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called upon to investigate and address questions of 
government failure and malfeasance. At Westminster, the 
parliamentary custom of ministerial responsibility—and 
quick, quiet resignation at the slightest hint of impropriety—
has historically narrowed the institutional space for robust 
investigation or confrontation of a ruling party and its 
conduct in government. Instead, a government may fall or 
call an early election, but even in London, there is an 
increasing tendency for the executive to brave its way 
through by actively attempting to “spin” public opinion while 
abandoning the custom of taking formal responsibility and 
accepting the resignation of those identified as culprits. 
Instead, governments are increasingly leaving the process of 
managing political and public service malfeasance to the 
courts through various processes of judicial review—either 
administrative law or, where appropriate, constitutional 
review. 
Even if parliamentary systems have never served as 
effective watchdogs, given the dominance of the ruling party 
and members of government within the institution, this does 
not mean that parliamentarians do not at times take up this 
role with some forcefulness. South Africa’s pre-1994 
apartheid Parliament did not, however, have such a 
tradition. Instead, the colonial and apartheid regimes that 
governed until 1994 maintained an “entire social 
edifice . . . structured to enrich a powerful few at the expense 
of the majority.”57 In the period between 1948 and 1994, 
Parliament served as a rubber stamp for the decisions of the 
National Party and executive. There were “many pressure 
groups, such as the wine farmers . . . who used their close 
proximity to Parliament to ‘take people to parties’ and 
provide them with a quota of wine annually[.]”58 
Furthermore, the increasing secrecy of the apartheid regime 
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and the expansion of covert operations after 1976—as well as 
the “history of routinised corruption”59 in central government 
departments and the “homeland” administrations—provide 
ample evidence for the following claim by Frene Ginwala, the 
Speaker of South Africa’s first democratic Parliament: 
[I]n South Africa we inherited an intrinsically corrupt system of 
governance . . . To survive, it created a legal framework that was 
based on and facilitated corruption. It has taken years in 
Parliament to repeal old laws and introduce even the basic legal 
framework that would enable us to deal with corrupt bureaucrats, 
politicians and police. The private sector also operated in a closed 
society and profited by it. There were partnerships with 
international criminals and the corruption that was built into the 
system is very difficult to overcome.60 
In contrast to this history, South Africa’s first truly 
democratic legislature seemed in its early years to be 
committed to diligently exercising its duty to act as a public 
watchdog. The relative strength of the legislature during 
these early years may be attributed to two factors. First, the 
initial post-apartheid Parliament, established under the 
interim Constitution, served simultaneously as the national 
legislature and as the Constitutional Assembly responsible 
for writing South Africa’s final Constitution. Given this 
historic Constitution-making responsibility, it is no surprise 
that many of the most prominent politicians and anti-
apartheid activists, from across three generations, were 
nominated and elected to serve in this first Parliament. 
Second, these individuals were held in high esteem and 
wielded enormous political authority within the ANC, which 
meant that there was a de facto as well as formal distribution 
of power between the legislature and the executive. This 
balance was also enabled by Nelson Mandela’s explicit plea 
that even he, as President, be held accountable by the 
collective leadership of the ANC. 
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The confidence of these parliamentarians was evident in 
the early practice of the parliamentary committees, which 
would ask probing questions of high-ranking civil servants 
and Ministers and, at times, take them to task. At the same 
time, however, the committees lacked the resources to 
adequately research and investigate issues. This problem 
was exacerbated by the historic physical separation of 
government: the executive and administrative departments 
were located in Pretoria, while the legislature was situated 
more than one thousand kilometers away in Cape Town. In 
a short time, however, the tendency of the executive to 
recruit many of the most effective politicians into the Cabinet 
and the tendency of Committee Chairs to use their positions 
to promote their political careers meant that those members 
who were within the government increasingly dominated 
Parliament. The ruling party became correspondingly more 
centralized and concerned with protecting the image of the 
government rather than raising questions about the 
implementation of policy or the integrity of government 
programs and officials. 
Apart from Parliament, there are a number of legal and 
constitutional institutions that have the duty and authority 
to provide accountability for individuals and government 
offices engaged in corruption and maladministration.61 First 
among these is the criminal law which, aside from a range of 
anti-corruption statutes, includes specialized institutions 
whose task it is to address organized crime and corruption. 
The disbandment of the original Directorate of Special 
Operations (known as the “scorpions”) sparked a series of 
court cases challenging the government’s anti-corruption 
efforts; this saw the Constitutional Court recognize that the 
government has an obligation “arising out of the 
Constitution . . . to establish effective mechanisms for 
 
 61. See generally Heinz Klug, Accountability and the Role of Independent 
Constitutional Institutions in South Africa’s Post-Apartheid Constitutions, 60 
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 153 (2015–2016). 
724 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67 
battling corruption.”62 In addition to the criminal law, the 
post-apartheid constitutional order creates a number of 
“integrity institutions” to ensure transparency and public 
accountability for government spending and 
maladministration. It was after the Public Protector, Thuli 
Madonsela, issued her report on the “security upgrade” at 
President Zuma’s rural home at Nkandla in March 2014, 
that the question of that institution’s constitutional role and 
independence headed to the courts. 
RESISTING STATE CAPTURE 
As far as some in the ruling party were concerned, the 
Public Protector was responsible to Parliament, which they 
felt had the right to both question the activities of the 
institution as well as decide whether the decisions of the 
Public Protector should be implemented. In support of their 
claim they pointed to section 181(5) of the Constitution which 
states that the Public Protector, along with the other 
Chapter Nine institutions is “accountable to the National 
Assembly.” In contrast to this broad claim of parliamentary 
authority, the Public Protector has, in each annual report 
since its founding, pointed out that section 182(1) empowers 
the institution to investigate, report, and “take appropriate 
remedial action.” Finally, the Public Protector has pointed to 
section 181(2) of the Constitution which states that the 
Chapter Nine “institutions are independent, and subject only 
to the Constitution and the law, and they must be impartial 
and must exercise their powers and perform their functions 
without fear, favor or prejudice.”63 
The first opportunity for the courts to address this 
question came when the official political opposition, the 
Democratic Alliance, brought a suit demanding a court order 
that Hlaudi Motsoeneng, the Chief Operations Officer (COO) 
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of the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC)—the 
government broadcaster—be immediately suspended.64 
Their claim was based on the Report of the Public Protector 
into allegations of maladministration, systemic corporate 
governance deficiencies, and abuse of power by the COO as 
well as a claim that his appointment by the Board of the 
SABC was irregular.65 While the Western Cape High Court 
ordered that Motsoeneng be suspended and that the SABC 
Board institute disciplinary proceedings against him,66 the 
court’s decision on the powers of the Public Protector led to 
some confusion. On the one hand the court ruled that the 
decisions of the SABC Board and the Minister of 
Communications to ignore the recommendations of the 
Public Protector were irrational and therefore 
unconstitutional.67 On the other hand, Judge Alvin 
Schippers also held that the Public Protector’s findings are 
not directly binding and enforceable since they do not have 
the same legal status as court orders.68 Using the Supreme 
Court of Appeals and Constitutional Court’s earlier decisions 
analogizing the Public Protector to the position of an 
ombudsman in other jurisdictions,69 Judge Schippers argued 
that while the recommendations of the Public Protector are 
not binding, the government officials to whom they are 
directed are not free to disregard them based on their own 
conclusion but rather need to either implement them or 
provide rational reasons for refusing to do so.70 This decision, 
an exercise of public power in its own right, would be subject 
to review by the Courts as would any decision by the Public 
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Protector that may be challenged by those affected by the 
Public Protectors findings or recommendations.71 
This tension, between the constitutional mandate that 
“[o]ther organs of state . . . must assist and protect these 
institutions to ensure the independence, impartiality, 
dignity, and effectiveness of these institutions,”72 and the 
seeming inability of the Public Protector to ensure that the 
institutions findings and recommendations were addressed 
by the government lay at the heart of the separation of 
powers question that the High court’s judgment in 
Democratic Alliance v. South African Broadcasting 
Corporation did not effectively resolve. While the court did 
note in defense of its own powers that “the rule of separation 
of powers cannot be used to avoid the obligation of a court to 
provide appropriate relief that is just and equitable to a 
litigant who successfully raises a constitutional complaint,”73 
its decision to equate the Public Protector with the British 
ombudsman failed to acknowledge that the legislative 
authority of the ombudsman in the United Kingdom is 
legally distinct from the constitutional status enjoyed by the 
Chapter Nine institutions and the Public Protector in 
particular. Even if the Supreme Court of Appeal and the 
Constitutional Court analogized the Public Protector to 
similar ombudsmen institutions in other jurisdictions, these 
courts had not yet directly addressed the question of how the 
constitution imagines the role of the Chapter Nine bodies as 
“state institutions supporting constitutional democracy.”74 
The difficulty in managing the relationship between the 
Public Protector and the government became acutely obvious 
when the Public Protector sought clarity over to whom she 
should submit her report on the expenditures on the 
President’s home at Nkandla, since the Report was in part 
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an investigation into benefits received by the President.75 
The necessity of asking this question only served to highlight 
the more general question about the precise constitutional 
status of the Public Protector and the other Chapter Nine 
institutions. Even if we conceive of Chapter Nine as creating 
an additional branch of government, as I have argued, this 
does not resolve questions about the precise relationship of 
checks and balances that a separation of powers 
understanding requires. It is this challenge that first the 
Supreme Court of Appeal and then the Constitutional Court 
took up in both the SABC appeal and the Economic Freedom 
Fighters case. 
When the case reached the Supreme Court of Appeal, 
(SCA) the Constitutional Court upheld the decision of the 
High Court requiring the SABC to subject its Chief 
Operating Officer to a disciplinary hearing and noted that 
“[i]n modern democratic constitutional States, in order to 
ensure governmental accountability, it has become necessary 
for the guards to require a guard. And in terms of our 
constitutional scheme, it is the Public Protector who guards 
the guards.”76 The SCA then rejected the High Court’s 
analogizing of the public protector to the British 
Parliamentary ombudsperson, noting that “the powers 
conferred on the Public Protector in terms of § 182(1)(c) of 
the Constitution far exceeded those of similar institutions in 
comparable jurisdictions.”77 Responding to the government 
counsel’s suggestion that the powers of the Public Protector 
are defined by legislation rather than the Constitution, the 
SCA argued that “[t]he problem with that suggestion is that 
the Constitution is the primary source and it stipulates and 
refers to ‘additional’ powers to be prescribed by national 
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legislation.”78 Thus the suggestion that the Public Protector’s 
powers are legislatively defined is “contrary to the 
constitutional and legislative scheme outlined above and 
would have the effect of the tail wagging the dog.”79 
Declaring the government’s establishment of a parallel 
process to “investigate the veracity of the findings and 
recommendations of the Public Protector . . . [to be] 
impermissible,”80 the SCA argued that the “Public Protector 
cannot realise the constitutional purpose of her office if other 
organs of State may second-guess her findings and ignore her 
recommendations.”81 Summing up its judgement, the SCA 
noted that: 
the office of the Public Protector, like all Chapter Nine institutions, 
is a venerable one. Our constitutional compact demands that 
remedial action taken by the Public Protector should not be ignored. 
State institutions are obliged to heed the principles of co-operative 
governance as prescribed by § 41 of the Constitution. Any affected 
person or institution aggrieved by a finding, decision or action taken 
by the Public Protector might, in appropriate circumstances, 
challenge that by way of a review application. Absent a review 
application, however, such person is not entitled to simply ignore 
the findings, decision or remedial action taken by the Public 
Protector.82 
Referring back to the decision of the High Court, the SCA 
drew a significant distinction between the status of the 
Public Protector under the 1993 interim Constitution and 
the final 1996 Constitution; it argued that the suggestion 
that the Public Protector had merely the power to 
recommend “appears to be more consistent with the 
language of the Interim Constitution and is neither fitting 
nor effective, denudes the office of the Public Protector of any 
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meaningful content, and defeats its purpose.”83 Noting that 
all parties to the litigation found the metaphor of a watchdog 
“a useful metaphor for the Public Protector” the SCA 
concluded that “this watchdog should not be muzzled.”84 
As conflict over the role of President Zuma in the corrupt 
practices of the Gupta family grew, different political parties, 
non-government organizations, and the President himself 
increasingly turned to the courts. First, there were a series 
of cases challenging the authority of the Public Protector, 
particularly with respect to that institution’s remedial 
powers. Second, there was a set of cases in which the 
opposition parties in Parliament approached the 
Constitutional Court in an attempt to force the ruling party 
in Parliament to hold the President accountable. Finally, 
there was a wave of legal challenges to the legitimacy of 
executive appointments and actions taken in the 
appointment, suspension and buying-out of the leadership of 
those government institutions that have the responsibility to 
investigate corruption and official malfeasance. 
Unlike the SABC case, which wound its way up through 
the lower courts, the conflict over the failure of President 
Zuma to “pay back the money” as required by the Public 
Protector’s report on the public money spent on his Nkandla 
residence and Parliament’s decision that he owed nothing 
brought the question of the Public Protector’s powers directly 
to the Constitutional Court.85 In its dramatic decision—read 
out on national television by Chief Justice Mogoeng 
Mogoeng—the Constitutional Court linked the response to 
the Public Protector’s report to the Constitution’s 
foundational commitment to the rule of law, arguing that: 
One of the crucial elements of our constitutional vision is to make a 
decisive break from the unchecked abuse of State power and 
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resources that was virtually institutionalised during the apartheid 
era. To achieve this goal, we adopted accountability, the rule of law 
and the supremacy of the Constitution as values of our 
constitutional democracy. For this reason, public office-bearers 
ignore their constitutional obligations at their peril. This is so 
because constitutionalism, accountability and the rule of law 
constitute the sharp and mighty sword that stands ready to chop 
the ugly head of impunity off its stiffened neck.86 
Discussing the institution of the Public Protector, the Court 
noted that to achieve its objectives, “it is required to be 
independent and subject only to the Constitution and the 
law.”87 This requirement, the Court stated, “would not 
ordinarily be required of an institution whose powers or 
decisions are by constitutional design always supposed to be 
ineffectual. Whether it is impartial or not would be irrelevant 
if the implementation of the decisions it takes is at the mercy 
of those against whom they are made.”88 The Court 
concluded that that the “constitutional safeguards in 
section 181 would also be meaningless if institutions 
purportedly established to strengthen our constitutional 
democracy lacked even the remotest possibility to do so.”89 
Detailing the constitutional place of the Public Protector, 
the Court argued that “[i]n the execution of her investigative, 
reporting or remedial powers, she is not to be inhibited, 
undermined or sabotaged”90 and “[w]hen all other essential 
requirements for the proper exercise of her power are met, 
she is to take appropriate remedial action.”91 Justifying its 
conclusions in the name of strengthening constitutional 
democracy and “breathing life into the remedial powers of 
the Public Protector,” the court held that “she must have the 
resources and capacities necessary to effectively execute her 
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mandate[.]”92 Rooting the Public Protector’s powers within 
the Constitution, the Court made clear that legislation is not 
able to “eviscerate” the powers provided by the Constitution 
as the “power to take remedial action is primarily sourced 
from the supreme law itself. And the powers and functions 
conferred on the Public Protector by the Act owe their very 
existence or significance to the Constitution.”93 
At the same time, the Constitutional Court recognized 
that the “Public Protector’s power to take appropriate 
remedial action is wide but certainly not unfettered” and that 
the “remedial action is always open to judicial scrutiny.”94 
Furthermore, “[w]hen remedial action is binding, compliance 
is not optional, whatever reservations the affected party 
might have about its fairness, appropriateness or lawfulness. 
For this reason, the remedial action taken against those 
under investigation cannot be ignored without any legal 
consequences.”95 The reason for this conclusion the Court 
argued is because “our constitutional order hinges also on the 
rule of law. No decision grounded on the Constitution or law 
may be disregarded without recourse to a court of law. To do 
otherwise would ‘amount to a licence to self-help.’”96 
According to the Court: 
The rule of law requires that no power be exercised unless it is 
sanctioned by law and no decision or step sanctioned by law may be 
ignored based purely on a contrary view we hold. It is not open to 
any of us to pick and choose which of the otherwise effectual 
consequences of the exercise of constitutional or statutory power 
will be disregarded and which given heed to. Our foundational value 
of the rule of law demands of us, as a law-abiding people, to obey 
decisions made by those clothed with the legal authority to make 
them or else approach courts of law to set them aside, so we may 
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validly escape their binding force.”97 
In conclusion the Court held that due to his manifest 
failure in disregarding the “remedial action taken against 
him by the Public Protector in terms of her constitutional 
powers” as well as his failure to “assist and protect the Public 
Protector so as to ensure her independence, impartiality, 
dignity and effectiveness by complying with her remedial 
action” the President has “failed to uphold, defend and 
respect the Constitution as the supreme law of the land.”98 
Addressing the actions of the national legislature, the 
Court was careful to explain its own role within the checks 
and balances implicit in the constitutional structure. Noting 
that it “falls outside the parameters of judicial authority to 
prescribe to the National Assembly how to scrutinise 
executive action,”99 the Court argued that the “mechanics of 
how to go about fulfilling these constitutional obligations is 
a discretionary matter best left to the National Assembly.”100 
By comparison, the role of the Court, Chief Justice Mogoeng 
argued, “is a much broader and less intrusive role. And that 
is to determine whether what the National Assembly did 
does in substance and in reality amount to fulfilment of its 
constitutional obligations. That is the sum-total of the 
constitutionally permissible judicial enquiry to be embarked 
upon.”101 Describing these as “some of the ‘vital limits on 
judicial authority and the Constitution’s design to leave 
certain matters to other branches of government[,]’”102 he 
concluded that “[c]ourts should not interfere in the processes 
of other branches of government unless otherwise authorised 
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by the Constitution.”103 However he went on to state that 
[c]ourts ought not to blink at the thought of asserting their 
authority, whenever it is constitutionally permissible to do so, 
irrespective of the issues or who is involved. At the same time, and 
mindful of the vital strictures of their powers, they must be on high 
alert against impermissible encroachment on the powers of the 
other arms of government.”104 
Despite these caveats the Constitutional Court found 
that “there was everything wrong with the National 
Assembly stepping into the shoes of the Public Protector” 
and that “by passing a resolution that purported effectively 
to nullify the findings made and remedial action taken by the 
Public Protector and replacing them with its own findings 
and ‘remedial action,’” the National Assembly’s action was 
“inconsistent with the Constitution and unlawful.”105 This, 
the Court stated, “the rule of law is dead against. It is 
another way of taking the law into one’s hands and thus 
constitutes self-help.”106 
While challenges to the nature of the remedial powers of 
the Public Protector were thus resolved by the Constitutional 
Court in the Nkandla case, the most recent challenge saw 
President Zuma attempt to prevent the release by the 
outgoing Public Protector of a report on state capture. 
Bringing an urgent application on October 13, 2016, the 
President argued that the Public Protector should be 
prevented “from finalizing and releasing that report”.107 
After the President learned that the Report was in fact 
already finalized and would be released, his lawyers 
continued to bring urgent applications to the courts; however 
once the court was ready to hear arguments the President’s 
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lawyers simply withdrew the application and offered to pay 
the costs of the other parties who had challenged the initial 
attempt to prevent the release of the Report. As a result, a 
number of the other parties brought an application 
demanding that the President pay for these legal costs 
himself since he had claimed his challenge to the report was 
to protect his own dignity and interests. In an opinion on the 
same day, also written on behalf of a full bench by Judge 
President Mlambo, the head judge of the Gauteng Division 
of the High Court of South Africa, the High Court found 
President Zuma personally responsible for all the legal costs 
from the day that he was informed that the Report had in 
fact been finalized. 
In his substantive challenge to the Public Protector’s 
Report on state capture, the President objected to the 
decision by the Public Protector that called upon the 
President to establish a judicial Commission of Inquiry into 
state capture but required the head of the commission to be 
nominated by the Chief Justice of South Africa rather than 
the President as provided for in the Constitution.108 In its 
decision on this question, the High Court argued that while 
the “power to appoint a commission of inquiry vests in the 
President alone and only he can exercise that power[,]” it 
does not follow “that there are no constraints upon the 
exercise” of this power.109 The High Court went on to argue 
that “even though the Constitution vests in the President the 
power to appoint a commission of inquiry, this power is not 
an untrammelled one; it must be exercised within the 
constraints that the Constitution imposes. The President’s 
power to appoint a commission of inquiry will necessarily be 
curtailed where his ability to conduct himself without 
constraint brings him into conflict with his obligations under 
 
 108. President of the Republic of South Africa v. Office of the Public Protector 
2017 (1) All SA 800 (GP) (S. Afr.). 
 109. Id. para. 62. 
2019] TRANSFORMATIVE CONSTITUTIONS 735 
the Constitution.”110 
Faced with a refusal by the ANC majority in Parliament 
to hold President Zuma and his government accountable for 
a pattern of corruption that was being openly discussed in 
the country’s print and electronic media, the opposition 
parties also turned to the Courts. The focus of these cases 
was an attempt to force the leadership in Parliament, and 
particularly the Speaker of Parliament, to bring a vote of no 
confidence to the floor of the National Assembly for debate 
and vote. First, the Constitutional Court issued a decision 
that required the dominant party to allow the opposition 
parties to bring a vote of no confidence to the floor.111 A year 
later, the Court issued another ruling indicating that 
although the decision lay with the Speaker of Parliament, 
any decision made by the Speaker must be rational; and 
while it was not for the Court to decide, it would seem most 
rational if the Speaker decided to allow a secret vote on the 
motion.112 Despite the Speaker of Parliament’s subsequent 
decision to hold a vote of no confidence in secret as well as 
massive countrywide demonstrations calling for action 
against corruption, President Zuma survived his seventh no 
confidence vote on August 8, 2017. The significance of this 
vote however was the fact that when the vote was tallied, it 
became clear that members of the President’s own party had, 
for the first time, voted against him, highlighting the 
growing rift in the ANC.113 
In another case brought by the parliamentary 
opposition, a majority on the Constitutional Court found that 
Parliament had failed in its constitutional duty to hold the 
President accountable for failing to implement the Public 
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Protector’s Nkandla Report.114 Accountability in this context 
is separate from a motion of no confidence since the 
Constitution provides a separate standard and consequences 
for impeachment of the President. The opposition parties 
pointed out that Parliament had not established any 
procedures for an impeachment process and a majority of the 
Court held that Parliament had a constitutional duty to 
create a regulatory structure for the implementation of 
section 89 of the Constitution which provides for the 
impeachment of the President by two-thirds of the National 
Assembly if the President is in “serious violation of the 
Constitution” has engaged in “serious misconduct” or is 
unable to perform the functions of the office.115 
The final set of cases involve those challenging the hiring 
and firing of government officials, often involving very large 
settlements. Among these, an extraordinary decision, 
Corruption Watch v. President of the Republic of South 
Africa, was handed down by a full bench of the High Court of 
South Africa (Gauteng Division) on December 8, 2017.116 In 
this case, the High Court invalidated the termination of the 
appointment of yet another Director of Public Prosecutions, 
Mxolisi Nxasana, as well as the settlement reached between 
him, the President, and the Minister of Justice which 
awarded him R17,3 million while declaring that he was a fit 
and proper person to hold the office.117 As a consequence of 
this holding, the High Court also declared the appointment 
of then sitting Director of Public Prosecutions, Shaun 
Abrahams, invalid.118 Furthermore, given the sustained 
criticism of Abrahams for failing to bring charges of 
corruption against the President, or even to investigate the 
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claims against the Guptas, the Court held that the President 
had a conflict of interest and therefore a new Director of 
Public Prosecutions must be appointed by the then Deputy 
President of the country—Cyril Ramaphosa—who was also 
given the constitutional authority, normally exercised by the 
President, to make all decisions involving the appointment, 
suspension or removal of the Director of Public Prosecutions 
so long as the incumbent President remains in office.119 This 
reallocation of the President’s constitutional authority was 
an extraordinary remedy but one designed to preserve the 
integrity of the prosecuting authority which many argued 
had been “captured” and was no longer performing its 
functions without fear or favor as required by the 
Constitution. 
These decisions, announced within the same period as 
the ANC’s National Elective Conference, during which the 
party elected a new president, Cyril Ramaphosa, set the 
stage for the next round of political conflict. After Jacob 
Zuma was no longer the leader of the ANC and his own 
preferred candidate had failed to be elected, the possibility of 
the ruling party “recalling” him from the Presidency of the 
country was placed on the political agenda. Faced with this 
threat, President Zuma finally complied with the remedy 
imposed by the Public Protector in her “State of Capture” 
report, by announcing in January of 2018 that he would 
appoint a Commission of Enquiry into State Capture to be 
headed by the Deputy Chief Justice who was nominated by 
the Chief Justice as required by the Public Protector. 
However, the senior leadership of the ANC remained split 
and the possibility of President Zuma resigning under threat 
of impeachment in Parliament—which would deny him all 
pension and other benefits—was floated as a possibility. 
While the ANC survived the 2019 election, it remains true 
that this was the first time they were concerned they might 
lose the majority, and, in fact, they still suffered significant 
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losses despite forcing Zuma to resign. 
While the struggle for political power and against 
corruption continues in the ANC, the narrow defeat of Jacob 
Zuma’s political faction by Cyril Ramaphosa’s anti-
corruption platform at the end of 2017, produced the chance 
for political change both within the dominant party and the 
state. The overarching importance of these internal party 
conflicts to South Africa’s constitutional democracy reflects 
the unipolar structure of South African politics. So long as 
the ANC remains a dominant party at the national level—
despite losing major metropolitan areas in the 2016 local 
government elections—there exists a form of dual state in 
which the party and state are deeply entwined. Under Jacob 
Zuma, this relationship led to the emergence of a form of 
“shadow state” in which corrupt private interests seem to 
have gained ascendency over even formal party structures by 
attaching themselves to a network of corrupt regional and 
national government leaders within the party. While the 
existence of networks, corrupt or otherwise, within polities is 
not unique to South Africa, or even dominant party 
democracies, the relative weakness of opposition parties and 
the remote chance of electoral punishment makes combating 
these systems of political relations and patronage more 
difficult. It is, however, just such a network, including former 
President Zuma himself, that has been increasingly 
challenged from both within the party and through 
constitutional means. 
A marked feature of the struggle between different 
factions within the ruling party and South Africa’s political-
economy more generally has been the use of law and the 
impact on different constitutional and governmental 
institutions. While President Thabo Mbeki was forced to 
resign on the claim that he interfered in the corruption 
prosecution of Jacob Zuma, the ascendance of the Zuma 
faction led to the hollowing out of key state institutions—
such as the elite police anti-corruption unit, the prosecution 
authorities, the widely respected tax authorities, as well as 
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the intelligence services—and their increasing deployment 
to protect Zuma from accusations of corruption. “State 
capture” added a further dimension as private interests 
began to directly dictate significant decisions, including 
cabinet positions and executive appointments to the boards 
of state-owned entities, producing grossly corrupt decisions 
that benefitted the first family and their private 
collaborators. Even as the executive used its appointment 
powers to undermine each constitutional institution—
including the Public Protector—a political backlash gathered 
ground from civil society, the political opposition, and from 
within the ruling party itself. Resistance from within state 
and constitutional institutions received increasing support 
from the courts and the dramatic decrease in electoral 
support for the ANC which led to the loss of major 
metropolitan areas to opposition parties in the 2016 local 
government elections finally produced a political revolt from 
within the ruling party which forced Zuma’s resignation from 
the Presidency and saw the election by Parliament of Cyril 
Ramaphosa as President in January 2018. 
In addition to the integrity institutions, the question of 
institutional independence arises more broadly when the 
constitution imposes an obligation on the state to address 
particular problems, such as corruption and organized crime. 
In Glenister v. President of the Republic of South Africa, the 
Constitutional Court addressed the “validity of national 
legislation that brought into being the Directorate for 
Priority Crime Investigation . . . [the Hawks] and disbanded 
the Directorate of Special Operations . . . [the Scorpions].”120 
Noting that “[e]ndemic corruption threatens the injunction 
that government must be accountable, responsive and open; 
that public administration must not only be held to account 
but must also be governed by high standards of ethics, 
efficiency and must use public resources in an economic and 
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effective manner[,]”121 the Court asked two questions. First, 
whether the South African Constitution “imposes an 
obligation on the state to establish and maintain an 
independent body to combat corruption and organised 
crime”; and second, “whether the specialised unit which the 
impugned legislation has established . . . meets the 
requirement of independence.”122 
Recognizing that the Constitution and the Bill of Rights 
“enshrine rights of all people in South Africa” and that 
“Section 7(2) . . . requires the state to ‘respect, protect, 
promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights’”123 the 
Court found that there is “a duty to create efficient anti-
corruption mechanisms.”124 Furthermore, the majority of the 
Court held that “to fulfil its duty to ensure that the rights in 
the Bill of Rights are protected and fulfilled, the state must 
create an anti-corruption entity with the necessary 
independence, and that this obligation is constitutionally 
enforceable.”125 
CONCLUSION: INTEGRITY INSTITUTIONS AND THE TEMPERING 
OF POWER 
The existence of a constitutional duty to create an 
independent anti-corruption entity as well as the 
constitutional independence for entities outside of the control 
of any of the traditional tres politica has become a central 
feature of a distinctly South African conception of the 
separation of powers. This conception of multiple 
independent entities within the overall system of checks and 
balances that forms a distinctly South African separation of 
powers was central to the Nkandla case126 and was reflected 
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in the whole set of cases that flowed from the struggle 
against state capture. While the separation of powers is often 
understood to be a means to protect human rights, the 
history of integrity institutions in the South African 
constitutional order demonstrates that the distribution of 
power beyond the tres publica may serve an additional 
purpose, that is, to temper power. A focus on institutional 
integrity has served in this context to ensure that the 
separation of powers serves to both set the limits on the 
power that might be exercised by different public institutions 
but also guarantees their power so as to ensure the effective 
implementation of the Constitution. To this extent, the 
outcome is to further the overall constitutional vision of 
social transformation by empowering each sphere of 
government to exercise the power necessary to affect the 
goals of the Constitution. At the same time, concern with the 
institutional integrity of each sphere of government requires 
that power be neither corrupted nor abused. 
This reading of the Constitutional Court’s separation of 
powers jurisprudence argues that the doctrine functions first 
and foremost as an inducement to each branch of the state to 
make its optimum positive contribution (in view of its special 
capacities or competence) toward the goal of achieving the 
Constitution’s social-transformative aims—a goal that 
includes but is by no means limited to the protection of 
individual rights, and that is equally concerned with how 
democratic constitutionalism might really work under 
current South African conditions as with any theoretical 
model. Now, if optimal positive contribution from each 
branch is the guiding aim, then contributions from the 
different branches and independent institutions would, of 
course, include provocations from each to the others to give 
due consideration to certain actions or policies that lie within 
those others’ domains; it would also include also resistance 
from each against overstepping by the others that unduly 
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infringes on their own work. But then the system has 
boundaries, however supple and context-dependent these 
may be, and who polices the boundaries? 
With that question comes something distinctive about 
the South African conception of the separation of powers. By 
comparison with most other constitutions, South Africa’s is 
especially outspoken and explicit about assigning to the 
judicial branch, and particularly the Constitutional Court, 
two specific responsibilities. First, by designating the 
Constitutional Court as the final arbiter of constitutional 
interpretation the Constitution allocates to this institution a 
special and supreme responsibility and authority to set the 
inter-branch boundaries of due and undue cross-branch 
provocation so as to protect the working spaces of the 
different branches of government. Second, the judiciary, and 
the Constitutional Court in particular, has a responsibility 
to act against internal breakdowns within the branches 
(itself included) by way of inattention or corruption. But that 
then creates a special challenge to the Constitutional 
Court—to carry out these missions with full commitment, 
while at the same time restraining itself against undue 
invasion of the provinces of the others. This dynamic was in 
evidence when the Constitutional Court was called upon to 
decide whether the government’s disbandment of an effective 
anti-corruption unit—the scorpions—was constitutional. In 
an unusually divided opinion, the Constitutional Court split 
five to four on the question of whether the legislation was 
unconstitutional. Furthermore, while the majority found 
that the legislation did not provide adequate independence 
for the anti-corruption body created by the law, it granted 
the legislature eighteen months to remedy the constitutional 
infirmity. The tempering of power in this context emerged 
from the institutional dialogue between the court and the 
legislature provided for by the availability of a specific form 
of constitutional remedy—the ability of the Court to suspend 
a declaration of constitutional invalidity so as to give the 
legislature time to act. 
